Developing Navy capability to recover forces in chemical, biological, and radiological hazard environments / Adam C. Resnick, Steven A. Knapp.
Material type: TextSeries: Research report (Rand Corporation) ; RR-155-OSD.Publisher: Santa Monica, CA : RAND, 2013Description: 1 online resource (xvi, 55 pages) : illustrationsContent type:- text
- computer
- online resource
- 0833085506
- 9780833085504
- United States. Navy -- Operational readiness
- United States. Navy -- Planning
- United States. Navy
- United States. Navy
- Amphibious warfare -- Planning
- Biological decontamination
- Decontamination (from gases, chemicals, etc.)
- Radioactive decontamination
- Anthropology, Education, Sociology and Social Phenomena
- Armed Conflicts
- Biological Warfare
- Chemical Warfare
- Decontamination
- Delivery of Health Care
- Environment and Public Health
- Military Science
- Nuclear Warfare
- Public Health Practice
- Public Health
- Social Problems
- Social Sciences
- Sociology
- Technology, Industry, Agriculture
- Technology, Industry, and Agriculture
- Amphibious warfare -- Planning
- Armed Forces -- Operational readiness
- Armed Forces -- Planning
- Biological decontamination
- Decontamination (from gases, chemicals, etc.)
- Radioactive decontamination
- 359.9/646 23
- U261 .R47 2013
Item type | Current library | Call number | URL | Status | Notes | Date due | Barcode | |
---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
E-books | Hugenote College Main Campus | Digital version | Not for loan | Only accessible on campus. |
"Prepared for the Office of the Secretary of Defense. Approved for public release; distribution unlimited."
Includes bibliographical references (pages 54-55).
Introduction -- Current Navy processes -- Current Navy capability -- Methods to increase Navy capability -- Conclusions -- Appendix A: Navy doctrine relevant to CBRN recovery operations -- Appendix B: Doctrine supporting CBRN recovery operations -- Appendix C: DOTMLPF implications.
Recovering amphibious forces can be complicated if ashore forces are attacked with chemical, biological, or radiological weapons. These forces may cross-contaminate others with whom they come in contact. And if contaminants spread to equipment and vehicles, creating persistent hazards, those items may pose an additional cross-contamination risk. Although the preference is to decontaminate ashore forces in the operating environment or in a clean area elsewhere on land, this is not always feasible. Using a scenario involving a Marine Expeditionary Unit of 3,000 Marines, 300 total contaminated service members, including 24 contaminated litter casualties and 75 contaminated ambulatory casualties, the researchers assess current policies and capabilities pertaining to the recovery and decontamination of ashore forces aboard ships and identify policy options the Navy could pursue to better perform this mission. They develop a set of policies to increase the Navy's capability to recover and transport contaminated land forces to amphibious assault groups and propose doctrine to support operational decisions.
Online resource; title from PDF title page (RAND, viewed on Dec. 12, 2011).
JSTOR Books at JSTOR Open Access